Spooky Chains
Max Stirner's Egoism and the Philosophical Dimensions of Freedom of Movement and Physicality
Stirner’s egoism is distinguished by its uncompromising individualism. He dismisses all ideologies, whether religious, political, or social, as "spooks"—empty constructs that serve to subjugate the individual. For Stirner, true freedom is achieved only when one liberates oneself from these spooks and embraces the ego’s absolute power. The "Unique One" is, therefore, a figure of complete self-ownership, whose actions are based on personal desires, interests, and will, and zero regard to imposed obligations.
Examining freedom of movement and physicality through the lens of philosophical thought is crucial, particularly in the context of contemporary societal issues such as surveillance, state control, and the regulation of bodies, because we find ourselves in an era where physical mobility and autonomy are increasingly constrained by legal, technological, and social structures. Stirner’s philosophy actually offers a unique and largely neglected perspective on these issues.
The scope of the essay will include an analysis of the theoretical frameworks of various thinkers as they pertain to movement, physicality, and autonomy. Through this analysis, I will argue that Stirner’s radical egoism offers a provocative reinterpretation of these concepts. Ultimately, this essay seeks to demonstrate that Stirner’s egoism not only provides a critique of societal constraints but also proposes a vision of individual freedom that is deeply relevant to contemporary debates on autonomy and physical sovereignty.
Definitions
A. Freedom of Movement
Freedom of movement seems like a simple issue but it is not. It is a multifaceted concept that encompasses the right or ability of individuals to move freely within and across spaces without undue restraint. It is a fundamental aspect of autonomy, which involves both the physical capability to move and the legal and social permissions to do so.
Legally, freedom of movement is often enshrined in national constitutions and international human rights frameworks, which pretend to guarantee individuals the right to travel, reside, and work where they choose. Well, within the limits of the law…of course. **wink wink**
Philosophically, freedom of movement extends beyond physical locomotion to encompass the broader notion of personal autonomy and self-determination. It implies the capacity to navigate one’s environment according to one’s own will. And…well…let’s get real. Nobody cares about your will. So…this concept is closely linked to the idea and conceptualization as well as the social negotiation of personal sovereignty. We think we have control over our own body and decision…but this essay will question this belief.
B. Physicality
Physicality refers to the embodied aspect of human existence, where the physical presence and actions of an individual are central to their experience of freedom and autonomy. It encompasses the ways in which individuals engage with the world through their bodies, which includes movement, expression, and the occupation of space. Physicality is not just about the body as a biological entity though; it is about the lived experience of the body as a site of agency and autonomy.
Philosophical Frameworks
In philosophical discourse, physicality is often explored in terms of how individuals assert their autonomy and identity through their physical presence and actions. The body becomes a vehicle for expressing freedom, resisting constraints, and interacting with the world. But physicality is also a domain where power dynamics play out, because norms, laws, and institutions seek to regulate and control bodies and, kind of, end up defining the space in which we can move, the expressions which we are allowed to throw out into the social space and who gets to have the most space to occupy. So, basically, physicality is both a means of personal sovereignty and a site of potential conflict between individual autonomy and external control.
These concepts touch on essential questions about the nature of freedom: What does it mean to be free? How do external forces—whether societal, political, or ideological—shape or limit our ability to move and act freely? How is the body both a site of personal agency and a target for regulation and control?
These ideas also intersect with broader discussions about power, as various philosophical frameworks explore how power structures attempt to regulate and restrict these freedoms. Thinkers like Michel Foucault, for instance, have examined how power operates through the control of bodies and movement, while others, like Jean-Paul Sartre, have focused on the existential dimensions of freedom as a personal responsibility.
In this essay, these concepts will be examined through the lens of Max Stirner’s philosophy of egoism, which offers probably the single most radical critique of societal constraints on physical autonomy.
Part I: Internal Relationship to Physicality & Movement
First, let’s look at the way we…silly little mindless biped creatures running around humping stuff understand our body and our mobility, from the most internal and freedom-centric philosophies ever thought up by anyone.
Jean-Paul Sartre: The Body as a Site of Existential Freedom
Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism emphasizes radical freedom, and claims that individuals are condemned to be free—meaning that they must continuously define themselves through their choices, regardless of societal constraints. For Sartre, freedom is an inherent condition of human existence, but it comes with the burden of responsibility. So basically, the idea is that every action is a choice that defines who we are, and with this freedom comes the weight of having to justify one’s existence through authentic action.
Sartre’s concept of freedom is not really about physical movement but about existential autonomy—meaning…the freedom to make choices that define one’s essence. However, this radical concept of freedom exists in tension with societal structures that impose limits and expectations on individuals. Sartre acknowledges that these pressures exist, but he insists that true freedom lies in recognizing and transcending these constraints through conscious, deliberate choice. Physicality, in this context, is the arena in which existential freedom is exercised, where individuals assert their autonomy through their actions and decisions, despite the limitations imposed by society.
Friedrich Nietzsche: The Body as a Facilitator of the Will to Power
Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy is centered on the concept of the "will to power," which he sees as the fundamental driving force of human beings. So, basically what that means is that the will to power is not just some kind of inherent desire for domination over others which he does acknowledge but it is also a creative force that drives individuals to assert themselves, overcome obstacles, and achieve whatever they want to achieve. Nietzsche’s idea of the Übermensch (Overman or Superman) represents the individual who has transcended morality and norms, and has created their own values and living according to their will to power.
So, in this framework, freedom of movement and physicality are expressions of this will to power. The Übermensch is not bound by anything other than self-created values. Physicality, in Nietzsche’s thought, is integral to this autonomy because it encases this power and allows it to move. Nietzsche celebrates the body as a potential site of independence, creativity, and, ultimately, freedom. This stands in contrast to the Christian tradition that he criticizes for denigrating the body and physicality.
Part II: External Influences on Physicality and Movement
But it just isn’t that simple, is it? There are differences in understanding, capability, potential. There is this material, supposedly objective reality around us which is constantly showing its luscious, giant titties in our face and flashing us with that Men in Black flashlight thingy. Half the time we dont have a damn clue what the hell is even happening around us. Let’s look at some thinkers who showed us just how mindfucked we actually are.
Herbert Marcuse: The Body as a Site for Repression
Herbert Marcuse is a key figure in the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, which critiques modern industrial societies for their repression of individuality and freedom. Marcuse argues that advanced capitalist societies create a false sense of freedom while actually imposing deep forms of control and conformity. Through what he calls "repressive desublimation," society allows certain forms of expression and satisfaction, but only in ways that serve the system’s needs, thus containing and neutralizing potential resistance.
Repressive desublimation refers to the process where the apparent liberation of suppressed desires in society actually reinforces control rather than challenging it. In advanced capitalist societies, consumer culture and mass media allow people to express their desires more openly, which seems liberating. Right? WRONG! This freedom is superficial because it integrates individuals more deeply into the existing system of power by turning these desires into commodities.
Michel Foucault: The Body as a Site of Regulation
Michel Foucault’s work extensively explores the relationship between power and the body. He looks at how institutions exert control over individuals through what he terms "biopolitics." Foucault argues that modern power not only operates through overt coercion but also through more subtle forms of regulation that target the body and its movements. Institutions such as prisons, schools, and hospitals are sites where power is exercised by disciplining bodies, shaping their behaviors, and regulating their movements. Foucault’s concept of "biopower" refers to the mechanisms through which states exert control over populations by managing life itself—health, reproduction, and even the rhythms of everyday life.
In Foucault’s view, freedom of movement is constrained by these systems of power. Bodies are subjected to surveillance, categorized, and controlled in ways that limit individual autonomy. For Foucault, the regulation of bodies is central to the functioning of modern societies, where power is less about direct domination and more about the subtle control of individuals’ capacities and movements. His analysis reveals how the body is a site of both compliance and resistance.
But how is this done you ask? How can authorities even control something like that? Well…Foucault argues that modern power controls individuals through subtle mechanisms like surveillance, normalization, and discipline, which shape behavior and limit freedom of movement and physicality. Surveillance makes people self-regulate by creating a sense of constant observation, while normalization establishes societal standards that pressure individuals to conform. Institutions use examination to assess and categorize people, further enforcing norms. Spatial organization, like the design of cities and institutions, controls how people move, and biopolitics manages populations through policies that govern health and life. Ultimately, these mechanisms lead to the internalization of societal expectations, where individuals discipline themselves, ensuring compliance without overt force.
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: The Body as Food for Capitalism
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari introduce the concepts of "nomadology" and "deterritorialization" to describe a mode of existence that resists fixed identities and static structures. For them, traditional societal frameworks, which they refer to as "territorialized" spaces, impose rigid boundaries on thought, identity, and movement. So, yeah. It goes deep. And while they focused a lot of their energy on figuring out how to get out of that shit, they also showed us that, first, we have to see that the things that are being done to us are the exact ways we can change our fate.
The body, in their view, is not a static entity but a site of continuous becoming. But that is the same with the very thing which holds us in place and tries to sort of pull us into various directions to make sure it has commodification materials. Because…for some reason…the nature of this existence, according to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, is basically just constant and relentless production, commodification and reproduction to then do the same shit over and over and over until who the fuck knows.
Deleuze and Guattari argue that capitalism which they frame as an almost fundamental entity which drives the production of desire, exerts control over individuals by manipulating both their desires and bodies. They describe how it captures and directs our desires through what they call "desiring-machines," by constantly creating new needs for consumption that keep us engaged and productive within the system.
Part III: The Body as a Site for Negotiations of Value
And then…it gets really dark. We are talking about negotiations of value being placed on bodies…
Judith Butler: The Body as a Tool for Internalization and Performativity
Then there is Judith Butler’s with her theory of gender performativity which deeply analyzes how exactly social norms manage to animate us to act the way we do. She views physicality as a site of repeated performances that constitute what is perceived as "gender” for example, which, according to Butler and…frankly…me too, is not an inherent identity but a set of actions and behaviors that are socially enforced and internalized.
Now…it gets dark. But it’s important we look at this. Because - frankly, it is fucking bullshit. There is no more disgusting aspect of authority than how it negotiates value through the body.
Frantz Fanon: The Body Dehumanized & Fetishized
Then, in a much deep and focused way, Frantz Fanon shows us how colonialism is particularly disgusting in how it exerts control over the physicality and movement of colonized peoples, which reduces them to a state of complete dehumanization. Fanon’s work emphasizes the psychological and physical violence of colonialism, where the bodies of the colonized are subjected to control, segregation, and degradation. So, in Fanon’s view, the body is not just a political and economic system but a physical one, where the movement and autonomy of colonized bodies are severely restricted and value on a large scale is negotiated which causes a lowered sense of self-worth, which is exposed as one of the most insidious and deep seated ways to control bodies.
What Makes Stirner’s Framework So Unique
I know…that just got really dark. But that, my friends…is why we have Stirner.
We have all these jumbled philosophies that are just all so valid in their own way. But the power of Stirner’s philosophy…above all thing…is it’s ability to simultaneously expose and critique and also obliterate the validity of all these disgusting ways we are defined, categorized, managed, brainwashed and trafficked.
How does he do that?
Fuck Your Definitions
Stirner’s central critique revolves around the notion of the "Ego" or the "Unique One." He argues that individuals are often subsumed under various categories and definitions imposed by external forces—whether norms, doctrines, or ideologies. These definitions are not legitimate unless you like them and agree with them.
They simply serve to constrain and manage individuals by enforcing conformity and suppressing personal autonomy. For instance, societal categories related to gender, class, or nationality are not descriptors but instruments of control that dictate how individuals should think, act, and relate to one another. Stirner’s philosophy exposes these categories as mere constructs designed to manage and exploit individuals rather than as inherent or objective truths.
“Fuck You, Fuck You, Fuck You…You’re Cool…Fuck you, I Quit!”
Beyond categorization, Stirner’s work explores the mechanisms through which individuals are managed and controlled. Modern societies employ various techniques to regulate behavior and maintain order, from legal systems and educational institutions to media and consumer culture. And this starts early on. We are taught to believe that we need parents, then teachers, then role models, then managers. These mechanisms operate under the guise of promoting societal good or welfare but in reality they just serve to perpetuate control and limit personal freedom.
But if you were to tell most people that, they would call you crazy. Trust me, they will. It happens to me all the time. And you know what Stirner says to that? Okay. And then do what you want anyways. Society is necessary if you are worried that you can’t make it on your own. I used to believe that too, until I decided to sleep in an abandoned building instead of paying rent. And even if your goal is absolute comfort, then okay. That’s legit. Just make sure I don’t find your house while you’re on vacation in Bali because then that shit belongs to me!!!
Okay, Spass bei Seite as we say in Germany…life is limited. You will die at some point. How much help do you actually need to make it through? You could literally walk outside and then your house is suddenly blown up by some assholes who supposedly exist to protect you or someone else said they would protect you but end up pussying out. These people arent making our lives safe. Just ask the people actually going through that right now as we speak. Just saying.
Un-Fucked as Fuck
What sets Stirner’s philosophy apart is its ability to not only critique but also obliterate the validity of these mechanisms of control. Stirner doesn’t just highlight the flaws and injustices of these systems; he proposes a radical rethinking of a self that transcends all belief in objective reality. His concept of the "Unique One" represents an ideal of complete absolute radical personal autonomy and self-determination. So, if someone were to walk up to you and say: “You have mustard on your face.” It’s totally legit to say: “No I don’t.” Even if you, yourself, can see it in the mirror. Just deny the validity of the mirror. It’s easy. And quite freeing.
In this way, Stirner’s philosophy offers a form of liberation that goes beyond mere critique to actively challenge and subvert the mechanisms of power.
Comparative Analysis
So let’s go back to these other thinkers and see what Stirner would do.
Physicality and Movement as a Spook
Stirner’s radical individualism fundamentally challenges the way the body and its movement would be conceptualized in philosophical discourse. While many philosophical and political theories advocate for something, ranging from Sartre’s self-ownership and conscious choices to notions of social cohesion and the common good, Stirner’s egoism places the individual’s interests above all such collective considerations. For Stirner, there is so way in hell anyone could ever truly control the unique one’s body, which he himself would see as nothing more than the agent and tool of his self-interest.
This rejection of collectivism distinguishes Stirner’s philosophy from those that seek to reconcile individual freedom with collective obligations. To Stirner, that is an absurd notion. For example, while Friedrich Nietzsche’s will to power acknowledges the importance of individual strength and creativity, it also sees the will to power as a force, something inherent, something with value. In contrast, Stirner’s egoism rejects the very notion of anything ever being able to decide or determine that value. Including one’s own will. The strength Nietzsche presents as potential or possibility, is relativized.
It’s a very interesting form of subjectivization which radically opposes all forms of essentialization. Stirner does not care about defining strength, power, will or self-interest. It depends on the moment. And the moment isn’t under anyone’s control.
Well…other than all the damn illusiory concepts and distractions floatinga round but that is another story.
Physicality and Movement as Ownness
For Stirner, physicality is both a site of external regulation as well as a realm of personal dominion. But at the same time, it is kinda not any of that. As much as Stirner refrains from defining anything - he doesn’t define the body either.
Max Stirner’s and Michel Foucault’s perspectives on the body highlight different dimensions of control and autonomy. Stirner sees physicality as a site of both external regulation and personal dominion, which isn’t really more tha the individual's ability to self-define. While the horrifying reality described by Michel Foucault and the others is certainly not untrue in Stirner’s framework - in fact, I would claim he was uniquely aware of these things in a way that was way ahead of its time - he outlines the absolute validity of one’s own legitimization. So, what that means is…while the reality exists, in a way, and, for Stirner, is the driving force of his desire to completely detach himself and his self-worth and definitions from that, he also chooses to frame it as illegitimate unless it serves him. And I think the thing that is most misunderstood about that stance is its unique way of taking the power of legitimation away from the anything outside of himself to elevate himself into a position of felt power, even if achieved by delusion, to live freely no matter what.
Foucault provides an absolutely invaluable framework for understanding how modern power operates through the regulation and discipline of the body. But Stirner shows us that it is important to remember that these are spooks. Because if we live our lives in resistance to these forces, we are legitimizing them and letting them legitimize us.
Conclusion: Spooks and Ownness
Let’s go back to what those other peeps told us: In relation to the internal relationship to physicality we got Sartre’s body as a site of existential freedom and Nietzsche’s body as a Facilitator for the will to power.
Both Sartre and Nietzsche emphasize the body as a medium through which individual freedom is asserted. Sartre’s view of the body as a site of existential freedom underscores the burden of choice and responsibility inherent in human existence. Meanwhile, Nietzsche’s conception of the body as a facilitator of the will to power highlights the drive for self-assertion and creative force. Stirner’s egoism is different though, as it pushes these ideas further by rejecting any inherent value or predetermined essence in these concepts. For Stirner, the body is neither a battleground for existential authenticity nor a vessel for an innate will to power—it is simply the tool through which the ego asserts its absolute autonomy, unburdened by meaning or value altogether.
Then, in relation to external influences on physicality, we have Marcuse’s body as a site of repression, Foucault’s body as a site of regulation, and Deleuze and Guattari’s body as food for capitalism.
Marcuse’s concept of repressive desublimation, Foucault’s biopolitics, and Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas on deterritorialization all highlight the ways in which bodies are manipulated and regulated to serve larger systems of control. But again, Stirner does something different: His response to these external forces is one of radical detachment and subversion. He views these societal mechanisms as "spooks"—phantom constructs that only have power if the individual acknowledges them. Stirner doesn’t recognize anyone else’s ownership of your experience.
And, lastly, we have physicality in relation to value negotiations, leading us into the realm of feminism and postcolonial studies, with Butler’s body as performed identity and Fanon’s dehumanized and fetishized body.
So, in the realm of value negotiations, Butler’s theory of performativity and Fanon’s analysis of the dehumanized body reveal how deeply social constructs can infiltrate and define physical identity. Butler shows how gender is performed and enforced through repeated actions, while Fanon exposes the brutal dehumanization and fetishization of colonized bodies. But Stirner straight up denies the legitimacy of any and all collectively legitimized identity formations or value system. For Stirner, it is absolutely delusional and ridiculous to believe that the body’s value could be negotiated or determined by anyone.
Stirner engages in a radical rejection of objectivity and this is the fundament of his thought process. He denies truths, materiality and legitimacy. These are contructs as much as our perception of ourselves is delusional. But rather than turning this into the foundation of some hedonistic massacre of pleasure, he wants us to know that we need to guard ourselves from the aspects of existence that may pull us back into spookland, such as mindless indulgence.
What Stirner is proposing is radical subjectivity, a refusal to legitimize or be legitimized, and a kind of detachment from ourselves and the concepts that could essentially identify or categorize us. In this way we can become the conscious guardians of our own agency.
References
1. Stirner, Max. The Ego and Its Own. Translated by Steven T. Byington, Dover Publications, 2005.
2. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan Sheridan, Vintage Books, 1995.
3. Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction. Translated by Robert Hurley, Vintage Books, 1990.
4. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes, Washington Square Press, 1993.
5. Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One. Translated by Walter Kaufmann, Penguin Books, 1978.
6. Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future. Translated by Walter Kaufmann, Vintage Books, 1989.
7. Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Beacon Press, 1991.
8. Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. Beacon Press, 1974.
9. Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by Brian Massumi, University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
10. Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge, 1990.
11. Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex". Routledge, 1993.
12. Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford University Press, 1998.
13. Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Translated by Richard Philcox, Grove Press, 2004.
14. Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. Translated by Richard Philcox, Grove Press, 2008.
Additional Resources
For further background and interpretations:
Wolin, Richard. The Frankfurt School Revisited and Other Essays on Politics and Society. Routledge, 2006.
May, Todd. The Philosophy of Foucault. McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006.