Thoughts on the Max Stirner vs. Friedrich Nietzsche Debate
A New Comparative Analysis of the Divergences between Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche
The philosophical terrain of radical individualism is often seen through the prism of two figures, specifically: Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche. Both thinkers launched vehement critiques against the moral and societal structures of their time, yet their visions, or in Stirner’s case anti-vision of individuality and autonomy, diverge in significant ways. Stirner’s Der Einzige und sein Eigentum (1844) presents a radical form of egoism that insists on the self’s primacy, rejecting all abstractions—what he terms 'spooks'—that attempt to exert authority over the individual. Stirner provocatively asserts, “I am my own only when I am master of myself,” [Stirner, 1844] emphasizing the centrality of individual autonomy. Nietzsche, on the other hand, in Also sprach Zarathustra (1883), introduces the concept of the Übermensch as an aspirational figure who transcends not only the metaphysical and moral strictures of Christianity but also the nihilistic void left in their wake. Nietzsche famously declares, “Man is something that shall be overcome,” [(Nietzsche, 1883)] suggesting a relentless drive toward self-transcendence.
“Man is something that shall be overcome.” [Nietzsche, 1883]
To merely conflate these two thinkers as advocates of radical subjectivity or critiques of Christian morality is to overlook a lot of things. Stirner’s egoism, with its ego-anarchistic assertion of rejection in regard to any and all ideological constructs, contrasts sharply with Nietzsche’s will to power and the creative revaluation of values. Where Stirner seeks to dismantle external constraints on the individual’s self-interest, Nietzsche calls for the Übermensch to affirm life and create new meaning in the face of a godless universe. As scholars such as Saul Newman (2001) and Gilles Deleuze (1962) have noted, this contrast marks the division between a purely negative freedom—articulated in Stirner’s egoism—and Nietzsche’s affirmative philosophy of becoming, where destruction is a prelude to creation.
This essay will engage with the philosophies of Stirner and Nietzsche and analyze their differing conceptions of selfhood, power, and freedom. The question posed by these two philosophers is not simply how to live in a world without gods or moral absolutes, but whether one should seek liberation from that world—and for that to be enough—or aspire to master it.
The Diverging Paths of Radical Individualism: A Comparative Analysis of Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche
While both thinkers are often cited as precursors to existentialism and nihilism, the nature of their respective projects offers fundamentally different visions of the individual’s place in the world. As Saul Newman (2001) argues, Stirner’s philosophy is essentially a negation of all ideological forms, while Nietzsche’s Übermensch embodies an affirmative and creative response to the crisis of meaning.
Stirner’s Egoism: The Primacy of Autonomy and Rejection of 'Spooks'
Max Stirner’s egoism, articulated in The Ego and Its Own, is a radical form of what I perceive as a kind of self-encasing and self-expression that prioritizes his sovereignty above all else. For Stirner, society, morality, religion, and the state are nothing more than 'spooks,' or ideological constructs that exercise control over the individual. Stirner’s egoism begins from a simple and, above all, personal premise: that he recognizes himself as the sole arbiter of his life.
“I am my own only when I am master of myself” [Stirner, 1844].
This mastery entails the rejection of all ideals, which, according to Stirner, are inherently oppressive because they demand submission to something beyond the self.
So, Stirner’s egoism is not simply a critique of religious and moral authority; it extends to all forms of collective identity. He dismisses nationalism, socialism, and even humanism as forms of enslavement. For Stirner, the individual should reject not only God and the state but also any notion of a 'higher self' that transcends the immediate desires of the individual. Stirner’s 'ownness' (Eigenheit) becomes the ultimate goal, which stands in direct opposition to any collective ideals. His work aligns with contemporary anarchist thought, although his version of anarchism is highly individualistic, as it offers no vision of a new society, only the destruction of ideological constraints on the individual’s autonomy (Newman, 2001).
However, Stirner’s notion of freedom is primarily negative—it is the freedom from constraints rather than a freedom to create or aspire beyond the self. Philosopher Saul Newman (2001) argues that Stirner’s philosophy is fundamentally nihilistic in the sense that it offers no higher purpose beyond the individual’s immediate self-interest. This 'nihilism' is not the existential dread of meaninglessness but the destruction of all abstract ideals that claim to offer meaning. Stirner’s egoist is satisfied with autonomy in the present moment, living without the need to justify their existence through higher goals or collective identities.
Nietzsche’s Übermensch: Self-Overcoming and the Will to Power
Nietzsche’s philosophy, by contrast, does not rest content with autonomy for its own sake but urges the individual to transcend themselves and the societal structures they inhabit. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The Will to Power, Nietzsche presents the Übermensch (overman) as an aspirational figure who embodies the will to power—the drive to assert, overcome, and create new values. For Nietzsche, the death of God signals the collapse of traditional Christian morality and metaphysics, which leaves humanity in a state of nihilism. However, Nietzsche’s nihilism is a challenge rather than a conclusion; it opens up the possibility for the individual to create meaning where none existed before. The Übermensch does not merely reject existing values but seeks to overcome them by forging new ones.
Nietzsche’s emphasis on creation and self-overcoming very directly distinguishes him from Stirner. Where Stirner’s egoism advocates for a rejection of external constraints, Nietzsche’s Übermensch embodies a dynamic process of becoming. As Gilles Deleuze (1962) points out, Nietzsche’s philosophy is affirmative, as it seeks to revalue life and existence in the absence of any transcendent truths. The Übermensch’s strength lies in their ability to embrace chaos and contradiction, and to transform these conditions into sources of creativity and power. Nietzsche’s famous injunction to "live dangerously" [Nietzsche, 1883] reflects his belief that only through risk, struggle, and self-overcoming can the individual affirm life in any sense.
Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power extends beyond the individual’s immediate desires, encompassing the drive to shape and impose one’s will on the world. This is a key distinction from Stirner’s egoism. Nietzsche does not merely advocate for the individual to free themselves from societal constraints; he calls for the individual to become a creator of values. As Robert C. Solomon (2003) argues, Nietzsche’s philosophy is one of becoming, where the individual is constantly in a state of transformation, striving toward the Übermensch. Nietzsche’s Übermensch is thus a figure of both destruction and creation, and therefore embodies the paradox of life affirmation through the rejection of inherited values.
Power and Freedom: Stirner’s Anarchistic Felt Power vs. Nietzsche’s Aristocratic Radicalism
The difference between Stirner and Nietzsche is perhaps most evident in their respective understandings of the tension between power and freedom. For Stirner, power is an individualistic, subjective force, expressed through autonomy and agency. This form of anarchistic egoism sees freedom as felt. It is experienced. And it is a choice which holds validity in the face of unfreedom. Stirner’s conception of freedom is also fundamentally anarchistic in that it does not seek to control desire to eliminate chaos. It seeks to dissolve structures and has respect for the power of desire as an external entity in a Deleuzian sense. This can be seen in Stirner’s persistence regarding the importance of finding spooks.
Nietzsche’s notion of freedom is somewhat more complex because it is intertwined with his concept of power. Freedom for Nietzsche is not just the absence of constraints but the active exercise of one’s will. The Übermensch is not simply free from oppression but free to create, and to potentially impose their will on the world. As Carl Schmitt (1922) argues, Nietzsche’s radical aristocratism reflects a hierarchy of values, where the Übermensch’s freedom is an expression of their power to dominate and create meaning. Nietzsche’s will to power thus represents a form of aristocratic radicalism, in contrast to Stirner’s anarchistic individualism. Nietzsche’s Übermensch does not seek to dismantle structures of power but to transcend them through self-overcoming and value creation.
Although Stirner does not necessarily agree or disagree with imposing one’s will on the world, he does acknowledge the inherent amorality of this process (power is fluid and can only be taken, which can potentially lead to a loss as well). This notion serves to counteract any claims tying a possible Nietzschean elitism to Stirner’s thought.
Nihilism and Existentialism: Diverging Responses to Meaninglessness
Both Stirner and Nietzsche confront the problem of nihilism, yet their responses to this crisis of meaning are markedly different. Stirner’s egoism, in its rejection of all ideals, leads to a form of existential nihilism where the individual lives without any higher purpose outside of self-interest. Stirner’s egoist does not seek to create meaning beyond the self; rather, they revel in their autonomy, unburdened by the demands of morality or collective identity. As André Cancian (2020) notes, Stirner’s nihilism is one of indifference, where the individual lives purely for their own sake, without needing to justify their existence through values.
Alexander Nehamas (1985) claims here that Nietzsche’s response to nihilism is more dynamic than Stirner’s. While Nietzsche acknowledges that the death of God and the collapse of Christian morality leave humanity in a state of meaninglessness, he argues that this very void presents an opportunity for the Übermensch to create new values. Nietzsche’s nihilism is therefore a precursor to affirmation, where the individual transcends the nihilistic void by embracing the creative potential of life. Nehamas argues that Nietzsche’s philosophy is ultimately optimistic, as it offers a path toward the revaluation of values and the affirmation of existence in the absence of transcendent meaning.
However, I do not agree with this assessment. I feel that Stirner’s egoism is equally, if not more dynamic, as the subjective meaning derived through the de-spookification of one’s own internalizations created by external ideals and the control of individual desire through the capitalist machine (Deleuze and Guattari) also represents a fluid, rhizomatic process.
Conclusion
My exploration of Max Stirner and Friedrich Nietzsche reveals significant divergences in their philosophies of radical individualism, particularly when I position my views against mainstream scholarship. While many scholars frame Stirner’s egoism as a static form of individualism—focused solely on rejecting external constraints—I argue that it embodies a dynamic, fluid process. Through the de-spookification of internalized ideals, Stirner enables a transformative relationship with one’s desires and autonomy, which allows for a nuanced understanding of freedom that adapts to contemporary contexts.
In contrast, Nietzsche’s vision of the Übermensch is often celebrated for its embrace of nihilism as a catalyst for value creation. However, I contend that this comparative interpretation may overlook the equally dynamic potential within Stirner’s rejection of higher purpose. Stirner’s approach invites individuals to revel in their autonomy without the burden of justifying their existence through abstract ideals.
Ultimately, while Nietzsche urges individuals to transcend their circumstances and actively shape their values, Stirner’s philosophy underscores the importance of personal sovereignty in navigating a world filled with ideological constraints. This duality highlights that the pursuit of self-realization is not solely about rejecting the past but also about redefining the present, which I see as evident in both philosophical approaches.
Ultimately, I think Stirner is misunderstood, especially in juxtaposition with Nietzsche. And I suggest an amoralist reconsideration of Stirner’s contributions alongside the work of Deleuze and Guattari as a better basis for understanding.
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References
Cancian, A. (2020). NIHILISM: The Emptiness of the Machine. Void Press: https://amzn.to/4guq5md
Deleuze, G. (1962). Nietzsche and Philosophy. Columbia University Press: https://amzn.to/4ebQlAm
Nehamas, A. (1985). Nietzsche: Life as Literature. Harvard University Press: https://amzn.to/3TBOjBg
Newman, S. (2001). From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power. Lexington Books: https://amzn.to/3XQKSck
Schmitt, C. (1922). Political Theology. University of Chicago Press: https://amzn.to/3XSCGZo
Solomon, R. C. (2003). Living with Nietzsche: What the Great "Immoralist" Has to Teach Us. Oxford University Press: https://amzn.to/4gBilPi
Stirner, M. (1844). The Ego and Its Own. Cambridge University Press: https://amzn.to/3MSt4Y3